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Abstract 
From data collected by questionnaire survey of three communes in the Kandal province of 
Cambodia, where public water supply remains inaccessible, this study estimates the demand 
function for drinking water and finds that the price elasticity is between -0.26 and -0.29.   Based 
on this, and given the price set by the Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority, expansion of service 
would increase per capita water consumption by 9.8 liters per day, increase consumer surplus by 
4.6 percent of total expenditure and decrease the number of households surviving on less than 30 
liters of water per day by 5.3 percent.   A simulation is used to calculate the water price such that 
the benefit of water connection exceeds the cost. 
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Welfare Effects of Access to Water Service in Cambodia 
1- Introduction 
Several previous studies find a positive effect of piped water access on welfare metrics such 
as childhood mortality in India (Guillot and Gupta, 2004) and Egypt (Abou-Ali, 2003), and Gini 
coefficient and poverty head-count ratio in Cambodia (Basani, Isham and Reilly, 2004).    In 
Cambodia, the proportion of the population served with improved water has expanded in recent 
years but remains low.  In 2008, only 55% of the urban population and 5% of the rural 
population had access to piped water (WHO/UNICEF, 2010).  The households that cannot obtain 
piped water must make do with surface water, wells, rain water, and the like.  Piped water 
service is supplied by both public and private providers.  Small private water supply networks 
serve some areas where public piped water is not available.  Surface water is a main water source 
for small private networks.  These private suppliers do not always comply with physical, 
chemical and biological standards for treating water before distribution (Baker, 2009).  They 
supply water by truck, rickshaw or small-scale supplying infrastructure.   Nevertheless, the water 
tariff of private suppliers is usually several times higher than public water utilities (Garn et al., 
2002). This can be a burden for people living in inaccessible areas, who are typically poorer than 
those living in accessible areas.  
Because of the political instability in the past decades, there are so far only a few 
development case studies that focus on Cambodia.  Among them, Garn et al (2002) conducted a 
survey of the performance of public and private water utilities, in seven towns and one district in 
2002.  They found that private utilities provided better service quality than did public utilities, 
but that private utilities also set higher prices.  Basani, Isham and Reilly (2008) use the data 
collected by Garn et al (2002) to study factors that influence access to water and estimated price 
and expenditure elasticities of the demand for water consumption.   They find that high 
connection fee is an obstacle for poor people to get access to clean water and that the elasticity of 
water demand ranges between -0.5 and -0.4.   Furthermore, they calculate that, if direct 
connection were to become available for all households in their sample, the Gini coefficient 
would decrease by three percent and the poverty head-count ratio would improve by six percent. 
This paper estimates the welfare gain using similar methods as in Basani, Isham and Reilly 
(2004).  However, there are three differences.  First, this paper estimates the welfare effect of 
access to pipe water based on consumer surplus gains, increase of water volume consumption 
and improvements for people living on less than 30 liters per day.  In contrast, Basani, Isham and 
Reilly (2004) focused on changes in Gini coefficient and alleviation of poverty.  Second, I also 
analyze the cost and benefit of the project, based on estimates of consumer surplus, and find a 
range in which PPWSA can increase its water price and still achieve improved overall welfare.  
Third, the questionnaire is done in the area around Phnom Penh city which is different from the 
locations targeted by previous studies.   
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2- Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority (PPWSA) 
Recently, with assistance from the international community and good management, PPWSA 
has developed its capacity for supplying water services.  There have been remarkable 
improvements in water supply coverage, continuity of service, and revenue collection with 
acknowledged good management.
1
    In 1993, there were 26,881 water connections (a mere 20% 
coverage), supply duration was 10 hours a day and operation costs were heavily dependent on 
government subsidies.  In 2008, there were 178,150 connections (85% coverage), supply 
duration was 24 hours a day and operating costs were covered by tariff revenues (Chea, 2009).  
PPWSA has undertaken to revise its tariffs in three steps.  The first step in June 1997 
replaced the previous flat rate with a rate schedule, and the second step in January 2001 raised 
the rates in each block (See Table 1).  The tariff schedule is one in which customers who use 
more water pay a higher rate.   This is one element of the government’s Poverty Reduction 
Policy.   In general the industrial customers and higher income households that use more water 
pay more than do others.   And those who use little water, which tend to be low-income 
households, pay less.  The tariff rate in the two lowest blocks is actually below the average cost 
of supplying water which is 900Riels/m
3
.   The aim has been for PPWAS to extend its service 
coverage without overlooking the poor and still maintain financial viability.  In addition to the 
graduated tariff schedule, low-income households have also been given discounts on connection 
fees and on monthly-installment payments.  As of 2008, these discounts have been proffered to 
more than 17,000 new customers.  Water supply capacity in provinces surrounding Phnom Penh 
is still limited, but there is a new project underway to expand PPWSA service to these areas 
(Chea, 2006).  My goal is to predict the economic benefit of this project based on data gleaned 
from a questionnaire distributed in three communes targeted for extension of water service. 
3- The survey 
The targets of the survey are three communes in Kandal province, Cambodia: Baekchan, 
Bakkhaeng, and Praekkompus.   The three communes are all in the expansion area but differ in 
ways relevant to the demand for water services.  
The survey was done by face-to-face interviews in the native language (Khmer) in August 
2009.  The questionnaire consists of three main groups of questions.  The first group of questions 
pertain to the respondents’ socio-economic data such as age, number of family members, 
occupation etc.   The second group of questions is about current water usage such as water 
source and monthly volume of water consumption
2
.   The third group of questions is about the 
household’s monthly income and expenditures and on what assets the household such as 
                                                          
1
 Some awards have been given for the good management and performance of PPWSA, such as ADB 
Water Prize 2004, Ramon Magsaysay Award 2006, French Medal 2010 (Légion d’Honneur) and the 
Stockholm Industry Water Award 2010.  The reasons of success and some developments of PPWSA can 
be found in Araral (2008) and Das et al. (2010). 
2
  For some households which buy water from private vendor through rickshaw or truck delivery, we ask 
number of barrels they buy monthly and calculate with total volume of water purchase by multiplying 
with storage volume of barrel. 
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motorbike, television, electric fan, cow etc.  In all, 180 households (90% of the planned sample 
size of 200 households) agreed to be interviewed.  The detailed results of the first group of 
survey questions for each of the three communes are summarized in Table 2.      
4- Methodology and Descriptive Statistics 
4-1-Demand Function and Elasticity 
       A demand function is estimated to calculate the price and income elasticity of water 
consumption.  The water demand function is  Q = Q (income, waterprice, Z), where Q is volume 
of water consumption per capita, income is monthly income per capita, waterprice is the flat-rate 
price of water paid by a household to buy 1m
3
 of water volume from a private vendor, and  Z is a 
vector of household characteristics used as control variables.  The demand function in log-linear 
form can be written as: 
iiiiii ZwaterpriceincomeQ   )ln()ln(ln       (1) 
where   is income elasticity,   is water price elasticity and i is error term. 
 
4-2-Consumer surplus based on price change 
       In this paper, the price paid by not-yet-connected households is collected through interview 
and it is higher than the water price of PPWSA.  The Consumer surplus is calculated following 
the same method as Strand and Walker (2003). 
First, the non-stochastic part of equation (1) can be rewritten as 
iiiii ZwaterpriceincomeQ   )ln()ln(ln  
Rewriting it in this form,  
ii PiAQ ln)(ln           (2) 
where iP  = iwaterprice    ;  iii ZincomeiA   )ln()(  
)(iA  is assumed to be independent among household. 
The consumer surplus is obtained as in equation (3), (the calculation is available in Appendix). 
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4-3-Cost and Benefit 
       From equation (3), the total benefit of the project is calculated using average consumer 
surplus, discount rate and life-span of transmission mains.   Suppose that ρ is the discount rate 
which is equal to long-term interest rate, 0<ρ <1, and t is life-span of water supply main, 
commonly 50 years.  
The present value of connection benefit to each household (PVB) is 
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The project should be implemented if the cost of connection is less than total present value of 
project.  The current connection fee of PPWSA is around 400,000 Riels (approximate 100USD).   
 
4-4-Descriptive Statistics 
The sample size is 180, which is 90% of our target number 200, as some households refused 
to be interviewed.   After removing outliers and incomplete responses from the sample, the 
sample size is 147.   Some households use their own water sources such as wells, for which there 
is no data on water price and these observations are excluded from the estimation.   So, in this 
study, the data used for estimating the price elasticity in equation (1) is that of the households 
who buy water from private vendors. 
Watervolume is monthly volume consumed per capita. It is the total amount of water 
consumption by the household divided by the number of household members.  Waterprice is the 
amount of money spent to buy 1m
3
 of water volume from a private seller.  The price differs 
among the three communes depending on the characteristics of the water source, location or 
water delivery methods.  Income is estimated to be equal to total expense per capita, defined as 
the ratio of household’s monthly expenditure to the number of household member.  In this paper, 
expenditure is used instead of income as most of respondents tend to understate their income 
relative to their expenses
3
.    In the estimation, household assets are also used as control variables.  
These include televisions, electric fans, and the like which may represent the household’s wealth 
(similar method as Basani, Isham and Reilly, 2008). The summary statistics for the variables are 
in Table3.  
5- Estimation Results  
The price and income elasticity of water consumption are estimated with two models.  In the 
first model, the only independent variables are water price and estimated income.  In the second 
model, in addition to price and estimated income, other control variables such as household 
assets and characteristics are also included.  Concerning the multi-collinearity problem, the mean 
vif value is estimated for both models.   For both models, the mean vif value is not more than 1.3, 
indicating that multi-collinearity is not a problem (See Table4).  The Breuch-Pagan test of 
heteroskedasticity is also conducted and the results validate the assumption of constant variance 
for both models.  The result of OLS regression demonstrates that price elasticity is between -0.29 
and -0.26 and income elasticity is between 0.59 and 0.65 (See Table 4).   
                                                          
3
 During the interview, the expenditure is asked before the income.  Surprisingly, several households give 
a lower income than expenditure.  Therefore, expenditure and family asset are used instead of income.  
This is similar to the method used in Basani et al (2004, 2008). 
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My results may be compared with the estimates of Basani, Isham and Reilly (2008) for seven 
towns and one district.  They found that price elasticity was between -0.5 and -0.4 and the 
expenditure elasticity was around 0.2.   My results show that for the households living in the 
three communes, the price elasticity of demand for piped water is relatively low, possibly 
reflecting the higher living standard of households in the three communes compared to those in 
the provincial areas used in the study of Basani, Isham and Reilly (2008). 
From the result of both estimation models, the average price elasticity estimated in this paper 
is -0.275.  From this, let us predict the improvement of water consumption conditions and 
increase in consumer surplus which can be gained if the water is supplied at the current price of 
PPWSA.  With the relatively lower price of PPWSA, the water consumer can save some money 
and improve water consumption (Table5).  From the result, approximately 4.6% of total expense 
can be saved from the cheaper water price.   Moreover, according to the guidelines of WHO 
(2005), to meet health standards, the minimum level of water volume needed for each person for 
drinking, cooking and personal washing is 30 liters per day.  Of the 76 households in the sample 
who bought water from private providers, 23.7% of them live on water less than the standard 
level.   This can reflect the low living standard, high water price or difficulty of access to water.   
Using the estimnated price elasticity, if the water is supplied at the current water price of 
PPWSA, the percentage of households living under this standard would decrease from 23.7% to 
18.4%.  Similarly, average water volume per capita would increase from 70.1 liters per day to 
79.9 liters per day, a 13.9% increase in water consumption compared with current water 
consumption bought from private vendors.  The percentage improvement can actually be higher 
than the above results if we take into account improvements in the convenience of water access 
and improvement in quality in addition to price effects.    
Consumer surplus is calculated using equation (3) with average estimated price elasticity in 
the two models equal to -0.275 and Po equal to the current water price of PPWSA. The result 
shows that the consumer surplus can increase by 4.6% of household total expenditures with 
current water price of PPWSA. 
The present value of connection benefit is calculated using equation (4) with the average 
consumer surplus discount rate equal to interest rate. The interest rate in Cambodia is fairly high 
on average, 7.65% per annum in 2008 (ADB 2009) and it slightly fluctuates yearly.   As the 
interest rate is not exactly determined, in the simulation, discount rate evolves from 5% to 20% 
to calculate the total benefit of connection.  Figure 2 presents value of benefit that each 
household may gain from connection.   For example, if the interest rate is 7%, the total present 
value of benefit from PPWSA service connection with current price is about 3.4 million Riels 
(approximately 870 USD).  Comparing to connection cost of 400,000 Riels (approximately 
100USD) for a water meter and 10-meter-long pipe, the total household benefit is several times 
higher than the cost.    That can be even higher if considering the improvement in health when 
using the well-treated water.  
According to population census done by National Institute of Statistics of Cambodia in 2008, 
population density in Kandal province (i.e. targeted location) is 12.8 times lower than that of 
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Phnom Penh city.   As densely populated area may serve with a cheaper water price as cost on 
network infrastructure can be lower (Estache and Rossi, 2002), we can consider possible price 
disparity between Phnom Penh city and survey area that may be implemented to cover the cost of 
infrastructure.   Figure 2 presents some results of present value of consumer surplus for various 
assumed water prices.   The simulation is done with some alternative prices: current block-rate 
PPWSA price, 1.5 times current block-rate PPWSA price, 2 times current block-rate PPWSA 
price, 2.5 times current block-rate PPWSA price.   As the interest rate is fairly high in Cambodia, 
the discount rate is set to evolve from 5% to 20%.    
From the result, we find that, the benefit gain is much higher than the connection cost.    With 
the simulation, the consumer surplus curve shifts down toward the connection cost, just equaling 
it when the price is approximately 2.5 times current PPWSA.    This is one indication of the net 
social benefit that the current water price bestows on each household.    The result can intuitively 
mean that there is a social benefit if more households were to connect to PPWSA rather than 
using their own wells.   So, the expansion of water supply to surrounding area of Phnom Penh by 
PPWSA is important to economic development. 
 
6- Conclusion 
The paper investigated the benefit of future water service expansion using survey data of 
water usage in three communes in the area surrounding Phnom Penh city, Cambodia.   From the 
estimation, this study finds that the expansion would increase dwellers’ well-being.  If Phnom 
Penh Water Supply Authority were to supply water in those areas at its current block-rate price, 
it would improve the water consumption and consumer surplus.    From this study sample, the 
expansion of water by PPWSA would decrease the population living below standard water 
consumption level of 30 liters per day by 5.3 percent, increase average per-capita water 
consumption by 9.8 liters per day, and increase the purchasing power of household’s total 
expenditures through consumer surplus gain of 4.6 percent.     
Further, from the result of simulation of water prices, average benefit to each household of 
the current PPWSA price is higher than the water connection fee.  The benefit becomes similar 
to connection fee when the price becomes 2.5 times higher than the current price.  So, the current 
PPWSA water price would imply high average benefit per household.  Therefore, households 
would tend to make water connection when there is service expansion to their area at the current 
price.  Further research on willingness-to-pay for water tariff and connection fee at targeted 
location may be helpful for setting future policy on water price, to make the service accessible 
until the poorest households. 
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Appendix: Consumer Surplus 
The calculation follows the same method as Strand and Walker (2003).  However, this paper 
assumes price of PPWSA is lower than current price of private suppliers, (i.e. Po < Pi). 
We have,   iiiii ZwaterpriceincomeQ   )ln()ln(ln    (1) 
Rewriting it in this form, 
ii PiAQ ln)(ln       (2) 
where iP  = iwaterprice    ;  iii ZincomeiA   )ln()(  
)(iA  is assumed to be independent among household. 
From (2), we obtain   

 iPiAi eQ
)(
 or
1)()(  i
iA
i
iA
i QeQeP

            (3)  


11
)(
)(

 ii
iA
i QiaQeP    where 

1
)(
)( ii
iA
QPeia       (4) 
Because )(iA  is assumed to be independent among households, )(iAe  and a(i) are also 
independent.  From Figure 1, the consumer surplus (CS) can be calculated by   
00
0
QPQPdQPCS ii
Q
Q
i
i
           (5) 
where Pi denotes current water price paid to a private vendor and Qi is volume of current water 
consumption.   P0 is water price determined by PPWSA, which is expected to be lower than the 
private vendor’s price Pi.   And Q0 is water consumption when price is equal to P0 
Figure1: Consumer Surplus  
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Replacing Pi of equation (4) into (5), we obtain, 
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Replace (9) into (8), the consumer surplus of household is:   
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Table1: Water tariff of PPWSA 
Category Before 
June 1997 
June 1997 January 2001-Present 
Block 
( m
3
/month) 
Tariff 
(Riels/ m
3
) 
Block 
( m
3
/month) 
Tariff 
(Riels/ m
3
) 
Domestic  
250 
Riels/m
3
 
15  
16-30 
31-100 
100  
300 
620 
940 
1260 
7  
8-15 
16-50 
50  
550 
770 
1010 
1270 
Administrative Flat rate 940 Flat rate 1030 
Commercials 
Industrials 
700  
Riels/m
3
 
100  
101-200 
201-500 
500  
940 
1260 
1580 
1900 
0-100 
101-200 
201-500 
500  
950 
1150 
1350 
1450 
Source: Ek Sonn Chan (2007) 
 
Table2:  Some characteristics of access to water of three communes. 
 Baek Chan Bakkhaeng Praek Kompus   Total 
     Percentage of water expense to total 
expenditure (%) 
6.2% 3.2% 6.6% 5.7% 
Average monthly water volume per 
household (m
3
/month) 
10.84 11.48 17.88 14.65 
Current water price ( Riel/m
3
) 2915 1796 4500 2770 
Buy water from private operator 46 22 13 81 
Observation Number 54 37 89 180 
Main water source Pond River Well  
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Table3: Data Statistics 
Variables Definition Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Watervolume Monthly water consumption per capita (m
3
) 2.10 1.83 0.16 10 
Waterprice Water tariff paid for 1 of water(Riel/m
3
) 2771 1374 380 6250 
Income Estimated to be equal to monthly total 
expenditure per capita (10 thousand Riels) 
10.7 5.81 0.93 31 
TV Number of television that households owns 1.10 0.57 0 3 
Motorbike Number of motorbike that households owns 1.05 0.81 0 4 
Telephone Number of telephone that households owns 1.68 1.26 0 6 
d_toilet 1 if water is used for toilet 
0, otherwise 
0.64 0.48 0 1 
d_commercial 1 if household owns business for which 
water is used as intermediate good.    
0, otherwise. 
0.25 0.43 0 1 
 
Table 4: Estimation of Water Demand Function   
Dependent Variable: ln(water volume) Model1 Model2 
ln(waterprice) -0.29** 
(0.145) 
-0.26* 
(0.155) 
ln(income) 0.59*** 
(0.147) 
0.65*** 
(0.145) 
TV  0.20 
(0.166) 
Motorbike  -0.13 
(0.128) 
Telephone  0.10* 
(0.086) 
d_commercial  0.48** 
(0.200) 
d_toilet   -0.09 
(0.188) 
Constant -4.10** 
(2.076) 
-5.29** 
(2.144) 
Mean vif 1 1.3 
Observation 76 76 
Adjusted R
2
 0.20 0.29 
Note: In parentheses is standard errors.  (***), (**), (*) present p-value at significance level of 1%, 5%, 
10% respectively. 
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Table 5: The benefit to be gained from PPWSA price comparing with private vendor’s 
 
Flat water price rate of 
private vendor 
Current  block rate  
price of PPWSA  
.  Percentage of household consuming    
   less than 30 liters per day (%) 
23.7 18.4 
.  Mean water volume per capita  
   (liters/day) 
70.1 79.9 
.  Percentage of increased water  
   consumption volume (%) 
- 13.9 
.  Ratio of consumer surplus gain to  
   total expense (%) 
- 4.6 
 
 
Figure2: Simulation of water price and consumer surplus gain 
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